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Summary 
The European Union has become a playground for experiments on 
the effectiveness of, and the frameworks for, fiscal policy.  There are 
two reasons for that.  First, while fiscal stabilisation has almost 
everywhere taken a secondary role to monetary policy, the 
European Economic and Monetary Union combines a single monetary 
policy with national, independent fiscal policies that constitute the 
only macroeconomic instrument available at the country level.   
Second, the Europeans have put in place in the name of fiscal 
discipline a quasi-constitutional framework that goes a long way 
towards constraining the discretionary leeway of national 
governments.   
The goal of this contribution is to take stock of the academic and 
policy discussions on the fiscal institutions of EMU, to confront the 
framework in place to what is known of the desirable properties of 
fiscal policy in a monetary union, and to discuss possible 
improvements.   
We start with a discussion of three requirements for the fiscal 
framework of a monetary union:  first, it should be conducive to 
public finance sustainability, because market discipline cannot be 
relied on to foster it; second, it should leave room for stabilisation at 
the national level; third, it should not discourage, and possibly 
encourage, structural reform, which is a key requirement for 
European countries.  We do not believe the European fiscal 
framework should aim at redressing the institutional failures at the 
national level and give European constitutional status to fiscal rules 
that do not feature in national constitutions.  Also, an appropriate 
fiscal framework should provide an efficient venue for deciding on 
discretionary joint action, without forcing governments to coordinate 
on a daily basis. 
We then examine how the Stability and Growth Pact measures up to 
these requirements.  We find that it has mostly failed on all three 
accounts.  Judging from debt ratios, it has not ensured public 
finance sustainability; furthermore, the net wealth of the 
government has deteriorated in several countries as gross public 
debt – a variable that is being monitored under the Stability Pact – 
has been reduced through asset sales.  It has not ensured 
stabilisation as aggregate fiscal policy has (on the whole) been 
mildly pro-cyclical.  And it has not fostered reforms. 
Whether the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact fixes 
those deficiencies remains an open issue.  The new version of the   3
Pact – we dub it SGP2 – relies significantly less on fixed rules and 
leans more towards discretion.  What it will achieve therefore 
depends on its governance.  Provided decisions are not driven by 
political horse-trading, a dose of flexibility would be welcome to help 
addressing the main challenges Europe is confronted with: ageing, 
enlargement and economic reform.  To this end, we propose five 
building blocks towards an effective SGP2: 
•  A better concept of sustainability.  We suggest that the Pact 
should focus on broader concepts than the current ones and 
propose to chose the net value of the government sector, i.e. the 
difference between its total assets and financial liabilities 
(excluding, at this stage, implicit liabilities such as commitments 
resulting from pension regimes); 
•  Harmonised general government balance sheets.  The Maastricht 
accounts are incomplete.  Eurostat should define an accounting 
framework for the publication of general government balance 
sheets, including assets, financial debt and information on implicit 
liabilities.  Specifically, we suggest to add to those accounts the 
present value of Age-Related Net Implicit Liabilities (ARNIL); 
•  Appropriate targets.  We propose that each government should 
target the net value of the government.  We outline a method for 
taking into account implicit liabilities (ARNIL) in the determination 
of the target.  Our main point is that countries with high ARNIL 
should set higher targets for the net value of the government; 
•  Refined procedures.  We propose that surveillance of national 
policies be based on a set of measures consisting of a fiscal plan, 
a reform plan and a contingency plan.  Thus, a more ambitious 
reform plan that has the potential of permanently increasing 
output and/or decreasing long term public deficits could justify a 
less ambitious fiscal plan in the short run; 
•  Better institutions.  We do not support handing over the 
responsibility for fiscal policy to independent committees, but we 
support the creation of independent fiscal audit councils.     4
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union has become a playground for experiments on the 
effectiveness of, and the frameworks for, fiscal policy.  There are two 
reasons for that.  First, while fiscal stabilisation has almost everywhere 
taken a secondary role to monetary policy, the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) combines a single monetary policy with national, 
independent fiscal policies that constitute the only macroeconomic 
instrument available at the country level.  Second, the Europeans have 
put in place in the name of fiscal discipline a quasi-constitutional 
framework that goes a long way towards constraining the discretionary 
leeway of national governments.   
The whole European discussion since the start of the EMU negotiations in 
the late 1980s (or even since the 1970 Werner committee report which 
blazed the trail for European monetary union) has thus been about the 
right balance between two contradictory aims:  to ensure that national 
governments are not deprived of any significant macroeconomic 
stabilisation instrument to offset asymmetric shocks, and to ensure that 
they do not take advantage of the single currency to free-ride on 
collective discipline and build up mutually harmful, unsustainable fiscal 
positions.   
The European fiscal framework has been in operation since 1999.  It was 
designed in 1991 for inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty
1, refined in 1997 
with the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (hereafter, “SGP”), and 
reformed in 2005.  This series of reforms can already be taken as an 
indication of the difficulty of the task.  Furthermore, while the initial SGP 
consisted of simple, quasi-mechanical rules, the reformed one is more 
complex and its implementation requires exercising more judgement.  A 
numerical, mechanical criterion (the 3% limit for the ratio of general 
government fiscal balance to GDP) has been replaced by a variety of 
standards for assessing the appropriate character of a budget balance: the 
position in the cycle, the nature of expenditure, the level of public debt, 
and the existence of off-balance sheet liabilities may all play a role in the 
evaluation.  The new Pact therefore leaves room for both fudge and 
learning-by-doing.  
The goal of this contribution is to take stock of the academic and policy 
discussions on the fiscal institutions of EMU, to confront the framework in 
place with what is known of the desirable properties of fiscal policy in a 
monetary union, and to discuss possible improvements.  It is organised as 
follows.  In section 2, we discuss the EMU fiscal framework.  In section 3, 
we describe EMU fiscal policy since 1999 and we assess the effectiveness 
of the SGP.  In section 4, we outline a “Sustainability and Growth Pact” 
with a view to putting flesh on the revised Pact and we draw our 
conclusions. 
                                                                      
1 The Treaty establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) was signed in Rome in 
1957 and amended in Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001).   5
 
 
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EURO  AREA’S FISCAL FRAMEWORK  
The key features of EMU are well known (see e.g. Wyplosz, 1997 for an 
introduction).  The countries that take part in it are economically diverse – 
and will become even more diverse as the eurozone enlarges.  They have 
achieved a high (though not complete) degree of integration of their 
markets for capital and goods.  Their services and, especially, labour 
markets remain fragmented.  They do have a common budget, but a very 
small one that does not play any macroeconomic role
2  and; and fiscal 
policy remains in the hands of national governments.  Those features 
differ markedly from what economists since Mundell have regarded as 
optimal conditions for operating a monetary union.  However the choices 
have been made and any change is bound to be very gradual.  If anything, 
the recent trend in the EU has been towards less, not more federalism, 
implying that a US-like federal budget is not an option for the foreseeable 
future.  Market integration will develop – including that of labour markets 
– but slowly; convergence may happen – but not necessarily; the EU 
budget may increase – but marginally.  A safe assumption is thus to take 
the set-up as given. 
With the above constraints in mind, we emphasise three desirable 
properties of a fiscal framework for a monetary union.  It should be 
conducive to public finance sustainability; it should leave room for 
stabilisation; it should not discourage, and possibly encourage, structural 
reform.  We believe those properties are fairly uncontroversial, but as 
always the devil lies in the detail, and the challenge is to devise a system 
which delivers all three.  Hence, they deserve a short discussion
3. 
Debt Sustainability 
The essential rationale for a common fiscal framework rests on the risks 
that unsustainable national behaviour would represent for the stability of 
the currency area.  The first channel for it, which has in our view lost 
relevance with free capital mobility, is the well known “common pool” 
p r o b l e m :   h i g h  d e f i c i t s  i n  a  m e m b e r  c o u n t r y ,  o r  a  g r o u p  o f  m e m b e r  
countries accounting for a significant share of the eurozone economy, 
could possibly lead to higher real interest rates and affect potential growth.  
The second channel is that a budgetary course that is not sustainable in 
the long run would eventually undermine the ability of the central bank to 
maintain monetary stability – an argument that dates back to Sargent and 
Wallace (1981).  One does not need to adhere to the fiscal theory of the 
price level to consider that risk: it suffice to recognise that if confronted 
                                                                      
2  In 2004, the EU budget amounted to €112bn, less than 1% of the combined gross 
national income of the 25 member countries. 45% of it went to the common agricultural 
policy and 34% to regional policy. 
3 Buti and Franco (2005) provide an in-depth up-to-date discussion of fiscal policy in EMU, 
to which the reader may wish to refer.     6
with the choice between accommodating the build-up of public debt in a 
member country and deliberately provoking its default, the central bank 
might wobble.  The third channel – which reinforces the second – is that 
the financial turmoil triggered by a default on the debt of any member 
country would have significant cross-border effects (Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz, 1998).  Statistics are imperfect, in particular because they do 
not distinguish between government and corporate bonds, but Table 1 
suggests that even putting aside Luxembourg, the magnitude of those 
effects could be far from trivial.  This is in part due to a home currency 
bias:  as confirmed by Philip Lane (2005), “EMU member countries 
disproportionately invest in one another relative to other country pairs”.   
When the discussions on the monetary fiscal framework began, 
economists pointed out that provided bailout of an insolvent state was 
credibly prohibited, market discipline would suffice to set the incentives to 
prudent behaviour right.  However, in spite of the explicit “no bailout” 
clause enshrined to this end in the EC Treaty
4, spreads on 10-year 
government bonds have converged in the run-up to EMU and have 
remained infinitesimal ever since, whatever the fiscal and political 
developments (Figure 1).  Investors have certainly taken note of the 
worsening fiscal conditions in Greece and Italy and the reservations 
expressed about the debt and deficit figures transmitted by both countries 
by Eurostat, the EU statistical agency, but they have not been impressed:  
the increase in the spreads has remained minimal.   
TABLE 1:  Selected cross-border bond holdings within EMU 
(Holdings of public and private bonds as a percentage of the investing 
country’s GDP, 2003) 
Investor   
Austria Belgium  Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands 
Germany 19.6  12.2  38.8  612.5  24.2 
France 4.4 9.4 25.4 278.7  9.8 
Issuer 
Italy 4.3  19.2  37.3  294.3 8.3 
                                                                       
Source:  IMF, Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey 
This may be taken as an indication that the “no bailout” clause is not 
credible and that financial markets expect that in the end, some form of 
financial solidarity will prevail.  However, it is not clear what could make it 
credible – short of an effective default.  Institutional schemes have been 
p r o p o s e d  t o  s t i r  m a r k e t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  b y  c r e a t i n g  m o r e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
among governments bonds.  Buiter and Sibert (2005) and others have 
urged the ECB to impose haircuts on securities issued by excessive deficit 
countries, when these securities are used as collateral in its tenders.  But 
this has been (rightly, in our view) opposed by the central bank because 
the ECB should take account of market prices, not try to manipulate them, 
and because its collateral is already valued at market prices (Papademos, 
                                                                      
4 Article 103(1) of the EC Treaty.   7
2005).  After all, a central bank is not a fiscal watchdog.  In November 
2005, the ECB reminded the market that it would restrict its eligible 
collateral to securities rated at least “A
-” by rating agencies, thereby 
relying explicitly on the judgement of the market. 
Our conclusion is thus that weak market discipline justifies the existence 
of an institutional device that fosters public finance sustainability 
throughout the monetary union. 
 
FIGURE 1:  Yields on Benchmark 10-year Government Bonds in the 
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Note:  Luxembourg excluded.  Source:  Bloomberg 
Stabilisation 
Since Robert Mundell reopened the discussion on currency areas in the 
early 1960s, the economic profession has debated whether a currency 
union could be effective without a fiscal union.  Peter Kenen (1969) 
answered the question in the negative, as did the 1970 Werner report
5, 
and the 1977 McDougall report on public finances in European integration.  
However, the 1989 Delors report and the Maastricht treaty emphasised 
instead fiscal decentralisation.  The case for using national budgets for 
fiscal stabilisation in EMU primarily rests on the absence of a federal 
budget for stabilisation purposes and on the inability of the common 
monetary policy to offset the asymmetric component of demand shocks.   
The usual doubts about the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy 
notwithstanding, this requirement has also been recognised early on in 
the design of EMU (European Commission, 1990) – hence the acceptance 
of a degree of national fiscal autonomy.  There has been a debate in 
                                                                      
5  “The margins within which  the main budget aggregates must be held both for the 
annual budget and the multi-year projections will be decided at the Community level, 
taking account of the economic situation and the particular structural features of each 
economy.  “   Werner Committee Report (1970).   8
Europe, as elsewhere, on the usefulness of active stabilisation policies.   
The consensus has settled more or less around the notion that member 
countries should steer away from active fiscal manipulation, and let 
automatic stabilisers play on the revenue side, while maintaining some 
restraint on expenditures (Brunila, 2002).  We regard this approach as 
appropriate in most circumstances, but we think governments may adopt 
a medium-term fiscal stance that departs from it (like the US in the 1990s 
or Spain in the 2000s)
6 and that they should keep in hand the option of 
discretionary fiscal measures in the case of significant shocks.  Recent 
research that points out the potentially detrimental effects of volatility on 
long-term growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Aghion and Banerjee, 2005) 
only makes the case for autonomous stabilisation stronger. 
Three more controversial issues are (i) whether monetary union per se 
induces a bias towards fiscal laxity that needs to be corrected;  (ii) 
whether EMU should be taken as an opportunity to correct existing 
political bias towards deficits; and (iii) whether discretionary fiscal policy 
has any role to play at the level of the euro area as a whole.  Let us take 
them one by one.   
The risk of a deficit bias in EMU – as compared to another exchange rate 
regime – results from the disappearance of the traditional closed-economy 
crowding out effect of expansionary fiscal policy, and from the removal of 
the threat of open-economy exchange-rate crises.  If governments are 
short-sighted or politically motivated, or if partisan polarisation provides a 
ground for attrition wars, the relaxation of immediate constraints can 
result in an addiction to deficits.  But monetary union also makes the 
longer-term constraint tighter by removing the options of debt 
monetisation and of devaluation (see Wyplosz, 2005, for a discussion). 
How governments react to a change in the exchange rate regime is an 
empirical issue on which there is little systematic evidence – as 
exemplified by the dispersion in post-EMU fiscal behaviours within the 
euro area.  We thus regard this argument as relatively weak.     
A related, but distinct argument is that the EMU fiscal framework should 
be regarded as a substitute for the absence or the inadequacy of national 
frameworks
7.  Unlike the deficit bias argument, this one is exclusively 
based on political economy concerns. Its proponents claim that in the 
absence of budgetary straightjackets, modern democracies are deficit-
prone.  Monetary union is thus taken as an occasion to give constitutional 
status at the EU level to fiscal rules that do not feature in national 
constitutions. What is frequently missing in such reasoning, however, is a 
proper justification of the EU involvement.  In our view, EU constraints on 
national policymaking can only be justified if they are a way to internalise 
an externality that is overlooked when decisions are taken at the national 
                                                                      
6 For example, after it qualified for EMU, Spain adopted and maintained a restrictive fiscal 
stance. This policy has had the effect of partially offsetting the expansionary effect of the 
drop in long-term real interest rates.  
7 Calmfors (2005) provides a good summary of the main arguments.    9
level.  We do not believe that the EU can simply claim to be a more 
effective and less deficit-prone governance structure than national 
authorities – unless this assertion rests on its less democratic character.  
National political bias ought to be corrected at the national level, not by 
imposing European constraints.   
The third issue is that of aggregate fiscal policy.  The current wisdom is 
that there is not much role for discretionary fiscal policy at the aggregate 
level.  A survey of the US experience by John Taylor (2000) concludes 
that since monetary policy “has been doing a good job” at keeping 
aggregate demand close to potential GDP, “it seems best to let fiscal 
policy have its main countercyclical impact through the automatic 
stabilisers”.  In EMU, it could be argued that the central bank has been 
much less activist and has on the whole done less of a good job, in part 
because the intrinsic diversity of the euro area and the ECB governance 
structure are obstacles to an activist monetary behaviour, and in part 
because the ECB statute gives less weight than the Fed’s to full 
employment, even though the actual weight of current economic activity 
in the ECB decisions is a matter for empirical discussion
8.  Thus, fiscal 
activism could partially substitute for monetary activism.   
However, coordinating decentralised fiscal policies is known to be 
adventurous, if only because finance ministers are accountable to local, 
not European voters.  As a consequence, fiscal policy coordination can 
only be relied on in specific circumstances, for example in the case of 
severe crises, if monetary policy hits the zero bound or if a contra-cyclical 
behaviour risks undermining its credibility.  Those circumstances do arise 
– as shown by the examples of Sweden in the early 1990s or Japan in the 
early 2000s.  But they are rare.  This leads us to conclude that an 
appropriate fiscal framework should provide an efficient structure for 
deciding on a discretionary joint action, without forcing governments to 
coordinate on a daily basis.   
Reforms 
While the trade-off between sustainability and stabilisation was recognised 
early on, the relationship between the fiscal framework and structural 
reform has only gained prominence in recent years, when the 
disappointing growth performance of most eurozone economies prompted 
simultaneous calls for structural reforms and further fiscal adjustment.  It 
is widely recognised that eurozone countries need to design and 
implement comprehensive economic reforms, both for domestic purposes 
and because well-functioning goods, labour and capital markets are 
needed for the single currency to operate properly.   
Governments generally undertake unpopular reforms that pay off in the 
medium term, but involve short-term economic, budgetary and political 
costs, in either of two situations.  First, they reform when a crisis looms 
and all possible alternatives have been exhausted; in this type of 
                                                                      
8  See Gerlach (2005) for a discussion.   10
“shoulders against the wall” environment, reforms tend to be 
comprehensive and frequently involve a budgetary consolidation.  Second, 
reforms can also be undertaken in better times and in a more gradualist 
fashion; in that case, fiscal support can be necessary to offset the 
macroeconomic costs, compensate the losers, and avoid building up 
constituencies against further reforms.  This amounts to sharing the cost 
of reforms with future generations, who they will supposedly benefit.  But 
reforms that entail an immediate budgetary cost are unlikely to be 
politically feasible in the presence of short-term budgetary constraints 
(see Razin and Sadka, 2004, for an application to pension reform). 
Empirical evidence on the conditions for reforms is mixed:  while Boeri 
(2004) and the European Commission (2005) minimise the link with and 
the role of the macroeconomic environment, Debrun and Annett (2004) 
reach opposite conclusions and suggest that the existence of 
macroeconomic support may be conducive to reform. 
The institutional framework of EMU can be regarded as reducing the 
incentive to reform in both cases.  The provision of a stable 
macroeconomic environment may eliminate the sense of urgency and the 
ensuing need for immediate action – in short, ministers do not anxiously 
watch their Reuters screen anymore, except maybe to check the oil price.  
At the same time, monetary support to reform cannot be forthcoming as 
the ECB only responds to the situation in the euro area as a whole, and 
fiscal support may be hindered by institutional constraints that weaken 
the incentive to gradual reform.  At worst, the lack of reform undermines 
the responsiveness of macroeconomic policy, which in turn discourages 
reform – a sort of rigidity trap (Debrun, 2005).  There is an increasing 
sense that the eurozone is currently caught in such a trap.  Moving out of 
it is not easy: even supposing political will to engineer reforms, the central 
bank and private agents must be convinced that those reforms are 
relevant and will increase potential growth.   
The absence of clear empirical evidence of this mechanism is not an 
excuse for inaction: the political economy of structural reform is too 
complex an issue for cross-country regressions to deliver unambiguous 
results.  Our view is that the need for reforms is too pressing for Europe 
to ignore the risk that the framework it has put in place contributes to 
discouraging them.  We therefore regard the incentives or disincentives to 
reform embedded in the fiscal framework as an important issue.   
Conclusions 
Summing up, the fiscal framework should strike a delicate balance 
between different goals.  It should avoid constraining national fiscal 
behaviour excessively while redressing possible incentives towards deficits.  
It should make joint action possible without forcing coordination.  And it 
should avoid discouraging reforms.  At the same time, the literature on 
fiscal rules (Kopits and Symansky, 1998) emphasises transparency, 
simplicity and enforceability as preconditions for effectiveness.  Any   11
judgement on the fiscal framework and its possible reforms must be based 
on these criteria.   
With these conclusions in mind, we turn to the assessment of the 
achievements so far.   
      
III. A  RECAP ON FISCAL POLICY IN EMU 
In this section, we survey fiscal policy in EMU since 1999 and assess the 
effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact.  We then summarise the 
main proposals for reforming it, and the reform package agreed upon in 
March 2005 by the European Council (a more detailed discussion can be 
found in Pisani-Ferry, 2005). 
The Failure of SGP1 
The Stability and Growth Pact as designed and agreed on in 1997 
(hereafter, “SGP1”) consisted of a medium-term target of “close to 
balance or in surplus” public finances in each member country and a 
binding 3% limit for the general government deficit-to-GDP ratio (there 
was also a 60% limit for the gross debt-to-GDP ratio, which was not 
considered binding).  The originality of the Pact was in the monitoring 
process, which combined ex-ante surveillance –through the discussion of 
multi-year fiscal plans, the so-called “stability programmes”, and ex-post 
constraints based on a quasi-automatic warning mechanism for “excessive 
deficit” countries and on a strict timetable for the issuance of public 
recommendations and, eventually, financial sanctions. 
We assess SGP1 against three metrics:  fiscal discipline, macro 
stabilisation, and support to long-term growth.  It is not excessive to state 
that it has failed all three
9. 
Whether the first two are attainable jointly obviously depends on the 
initial fiscal position and on the position in the cycle.  Having failed to take 
advantage of the 1998-2001 upswing to improve their structural fiscal 
position (Figure 2), EMU countries soon found them to be contradictory.  
Faced with the post-2001 slowdown, they had to choose between pursuing 
fiscal consolidation and supporting economic activity: like Buridan’s ass, 
they decided to do neither. 
SGP1 thus failed to correct the deficit bias of EMU.  While member 
countries had committed to bringing their public finances “back to balance 
or in surplus”, the cyclically-adjusted aggregate public deficit of the 
eurozone actually increased from 1.6% in 1999 to 2.6% in 2004 and 
aggregate public debt only marginally decreased, from 72.7% to 70.8%.  
Stability programmes were not anchors but moving targets
10.   
                                                                      
9 For a discussion of the SGP and of the reasons why it was adopted in 1997, see the 
contributions collected in Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001). 
10 Another failure is the resurgence of the electoral budget cycle, as evidenced by Buti 
and van den Noord (2004).     12
Germany, France and Italy bear most of the responsibility.  Buti and 
Pench (2004) have identified four reasons why:  proactive fiscal policies 
are thought to be more efficient in larger, relatively less open economies; 
potential growth is lower in these countries, making fiscal adjustment 
more difficult; peer pressure does not impress larger countries too much; 
and all three delegate fiscal responsibility to their Finance minister rather 
than building consensus at a cabinet level, making fiscal adjustment more 
difficult to enforce.   
It has also been noted that many member countries have used loopholes 
in the European system of accounts to reduce the deficit reported to 
Eurostat rather than actually decrease spending, using “innovative” one-
off transactions such as securitisation, financial derivatives, one-off 
payments by State-related entities, etc.  We come back to this issue later.   
The Pact eventually became dysfunctional when it appeared that the 
Council would not impose sanctions on excessive deficit countries.  Given 
this dismal track record, it is hard to understand why some have warned 
against reforming the Pact on the ground that this would impair its 
credibility. 
SGP1 also failed to contribute to macroeconomic stability.  True, Gali and 
Perrotti (2003) have shown that fiscal policy has been less pro-cyclical in 
the eurozone since the introduction in the euro than before, leading to a 
more stable macro environment.  The SGP has limited the scope for the 
kind of destabilising discretionary impulses that dominated the 1980s and 
1990s in Europe
11.  It was therefore an improvement.  But Figure 2 
illustrates that fiscal policy remained far from appropriate
12.  The fiscal 
stance was generally mildly pro-cyclical in the eurozone in the period 
1997-2005.  It responded much less to the slowdown than in the UK or 
the US:  between 2000 and 2003, the cyclically-adjusted primary surplus 
declined by 4.9% of GDP in the UK against 1.1% of GDP in the eurozone
13. 
                                                                      
11 Debrun and Masson (2004) have found that fiscal policies have been less pro-cyclical 
after 1999 in the eurozone  thanks to a change of behaviour in the lowest phase of the 
cycle.  Ironically, the SGP has helped governments ... not to fight deficits too much when 
they are larger for cyclical reasons. 
12 Figure 2 should be taken with a grain of salt:  a better measure of the discretionary 
impulse would correct for the “one-off” measures mentioned above, and 2001 and 2002 
are less clearly pro-cyclical than 2000 since the output gap was already decreasing.   
13 It decreased from 3.1% to -1.8% of GDP in the UK, and from 1.9% to 0.8% of GDP in 
the eurozone (European Commission figures).   13
Figure 2: The fiscal stance of the Eurozone
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                  Source:  European Commission, AMECO database 
 
Finally, the Stability and Growth Pact did not help eurozone countries 
increase their long-term growth rate, in accordance with the goals of the 
Lisbon Summit of 2000.  By treating all expenditures the same way, the 
Pact may have created a bias against public investment at a time where 
Europe should have increased its capital/labour ratio to catch-up with the 
US.  It can be argued however that there is no clear evidence that Europe 
lacks public (as opposed to private) investment
14, and that the choice 
between current spending and investment is not changed by the Pact.   
Less directly but perhaps more importantly, by constraining fiscal policy in 
the short term, it has contributed to reinforcing the governments’ myopia 
and has added to the difficulty of structural reforms, as these reforms 
tend to imply short-term macroeconomic and budgetary costs. 
Ownership and Incentives 
Why has SGP1 failed? Part of the explanation is certainly that it was 
poorly designed.  Critics (Pisani-Ferry 1996, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
1998) pointed out early on the risks of a Pact focussed on headline rather 
than structural deficits, of the neglect of debts, or of the rough definition 
of the ”extraordinary circumstances” (i.e. recessions) which could exempt 
excessive deficit countries from financial sanctions.  All that proved to be 
true.  But a more fundamental flaw proved to be the lack of incentives to 
comply with the spirit of the Pact and the lack of ownership of it in the 
main eurozone countries.  In France, Germany or Italy, the Pact has not 
really been appropriated as a key feature of the fiscal policy framework.  
To the extent it has, it was more with reference to the 3% threshold than 
through the commitment to the “close to balance or in surplus” target.  At 
                                                                      
14  As Jakob von Weiszäcker has pointed out to us, the lack of public investment in 
Germany has probably more to do with rising social expenditures than with any European 
constraint.   14
the peak of the cycle, the 3% limit gave rise to perverse incentives, as a 
deficit of 1.5% of GDP was considered safe and virtuous enough.   
Furthermore, the very existence of the Pact may have discouraged the 
adoption of national fiscal frameworks such as the British “Code for Fiscal 
Stability” adopted in 1998.  The focus of the discussion on the potentially 
harmful effects of fiscal laxity on a country’s neighbours has distracted the 
policymakers’ attention from generally more important issues such as the 
intergenerational redistribution involved in fiscal deficits or the 
composition of fiscal stabilisation.  For example, in 2005 French Finance 
minister Thierry Breton could present the level and sustainability of public 
debt to the public as entirely novel issues. 
The Importance of Government Balance Sheets 
A less well-known feature of the Pact has been its focus on partial criteria 
such as deficit and debt, rather than on the full government balance sheet.  
Two topics deserve discussion here.   
The first one is the notion of public finance sustainability.  This raises 
issues of measurement.  The literature on sustainability focuses on the 
balance between net government debt (i.e. financial debt less the value of 
financial and non-financial assets) and the sequence of future primary 
cash flows.  Any notion of sustainability should therefore make reference 
to the structure of today’s balance sheet and to future revenues or 
liabilities (see Buiter and Grafe, 2002, for an in-depth analysis of these 
issues). 
The other one is the increasing use by European governments of one-off 
revenue measures or of vehicles that allow spending without impacting 
the recorded deficit, leading to an increasing discrepancy between 
cumulated deficits and debt.  This possibility had been pointed out at an 
early stage by Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993) and the reality has 
exceeded expectations.  Koen and Van Den Noord (2005) and Von Hagen 
and Wolff (2004) have provided evidence that one-off measures have 
been used more frequently since the inception of EMU and have proven 
that their probability has been correlated with the magnitude of the deficit.  
There have been outright disposals of public assets with the aim of 
lowering the gross debt (but without any improvement in the underlying 
net wealth).  There have been more devious operations aimed at 
substituting on-balance debt for off-balance liabilities.  Some countries 
have cashed in an immediate revenue in exchange either for additional 
pension liabilities (France Telecom and EDF transfers in France, postal 
pensions securitisation in Germany), or for lower future revenues (Italian, 
Portuguese or Greek securitisations).  The former are mere balance sheet 
restructuring and (given the disposal price is right) they do not impact on 
the true economic value of the public sector, but the incentive is for the 
government to overlook the long-term price while focusing on the short-
term benefits.  The latter turn on-balance into off-balance liabilities.   
Hence the need for a comprehensive view of government balance sheets.   15
The most elaborate attempt to investigate empirically the dynamics of EU 
governments’ valuations was undertaken by Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama 
(2004).  In the absence of a harmonised set of balance sheet accounts for 
governments, they had to use yearly flows and to produce their own 
valuation of non-financial assets.  They tracked the yearly changes in 
financial liabilities on the one hand, and in financial and non-financial 
assets on the other hand, and corrected for valuation effects.  They 
uncovered a sharp contrast between the periods 1992-1997 and 1997-
2002.  In the first period, increases in general government liabilities were 
matched by changes in assets and the net value of governments was 
relatively stable.  This was not the case in the second period (Figure 3):  
the SGP involved a perverse incentive to contain the rise in the gross 
public debt through asset sales, and EU governments were poorer in 2002 
than in 1997. 
 
FIGURE 3:  Changes in Government Assets and Liabilities 
1992-1997 
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1997-2002 
 
                                           Source:  Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2004) 
 
When properly assessed, the effect of the SGP on the sustainability of 
public finances has thus been less positive than commonly believed, and 
the reliance on partial targets has had the usual effect of giving incentives 
to window-dressing.   
 
Reform Proposals 
Many proposals have been made to reform the SGP that can be grouped 
in five, mutually non-exclusive options aiming at:   
1.  Improving the cyclical properties of the Pact by introducing more 
discipline at the peak of the cycle and more flexibility at the trough 
(Sapir et al., 2004); 
2. Shifting the emphasis away from the deficit and towards public finance 
sustainability.  This can be done by conditioning the deficit limit to the 
debt level (Calmfors and Corsetti, 2003), or more accurately by 
assessing sustainability using some projections of future public finance 
paths (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2005);   
3. Correcting the anti-investment bias with a golden rule of some sort or 
by introducing capital budgeting for governments (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2004); 
4.  Fixing the institutions rather than the rules, by delegating some 
aspects of fiscal policy (say, limits to the aggregate budget position) to 
independent expert committees (Wyplosz, 2005, Calmfors, 2005);   
5.  Allocating deficit rights at the eurozone level, so as to solve the 
“common pool” problem.  This includes the monitoring of the aggregate   17
eurozone deficit proposed by French Finance minister Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn at the Ecofin Council of Dresden in April 1999, and the 
“tradable deficit permits” proposal of Casella (1999), inspired by the 
schemes put in place to control greenhouse emissions.   
As pointed out by Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2005), each of these 
proposals addresses a specific problem of SGP1, but none of them solves 
them all. 
The Revised Stability and Growth Pact 
After the November 2003 decision of EU Finance Ministers (the so-called 
Ecofin Council) to suspend the application of the excessive deficit 
procedure to France and Germany, the need for a reform became evident.  
In the debate that ensued, the European Commission (2004) and the 
Ecofin Council substantially acknowledged the criticisms addressed to the 
SGP and took them partially on board in devising a revised Pact, which 
was approved in Spring 2005.  Of the five options listed above, the 
Council took up the first two (improve the cyclical properties, acknowledge 
sustainability), excluded the third (carving out public investment) in spite 
of the repeated pressures of member countries such as Britain, Italy, and 
France, and concluded from the fourth that national institutions should be 
more involved in the budgetary surveillance process
15.  As to the fifth one, 
it has surfaced in the discussions on coordination within the Eurogroup, 
but remains off the SGP agenda.   
Box 1:  The revised Stability and Growth Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact was revised in June 2005 (see the legal 
provisions in EU Council, 2005a and 2005b, and Buti, Eijffinger and 
Franco, 2005 or Calmfors, 2005, for a detailed presentation).  The revision 
does not affect the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, in particular the definition and 
numerical value of the deficit and debt-to-GDP ceilings, but it replaces the 
1997 regulation establishing the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
addresses both prevention and sanction. 
As before, member countries submit medium-term targets and 
adjustment paths (the so-called ‘stability programmes’) for their general 
government deficit.  Medium-term targets are now defined on a cyclically-
adjusted basis and can differ from one country to another depending on 
potential growth rates and debt levels.  It is envisaged that at some point 
in the future, off-balance liabilities such as pension rights will also be 
taken into account.  Deviation from the target and/or adjustment path 
( b u t  n o t  d e f i c i t s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  3 %  o f  G D P )  c a n  b e  a u t h o r i s e d  a s  a  
consequence of structural reforms with short-term budgetary costs but 
long-term benefits. 
The definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’, under which member 
countries may breach the deficit ceiling without being sanctioned, was also 
changed.  They now correspond to a negative GDP growth rate or a 
                                                                      
15 See Deroose and Langedijk (2005) for a presentation of the Commission view.   18
protracted period of low growth relative to the potential growth rate, 
giving in effect member countries an extended deadline to correct their 
excessive deficits.  When the deficit is marginally above 3%, the 
Commission will also take into account what is called in the treaty ‘other 
relevant factors’, a modest term for a host of possible exemptions such as 
R&D expenditures, development aid, or else the financing of European 
(read:  German) unification. 
The Council also emphasised the need to associate national Parliaments 
more closely, and to improve the reliability and timeliness of budgetary 
forecasts and statistics.  The Commission’s initial proposals, to build 
stability programmes based on Commission forecasts and to establish 
independent monitoring bodies, were rejected. 
 
The main features of ‘SGP2’ are the new emphasis on public finance 
sustainability, and the added flexibility given to member countries in 
economic slowdowns (see Box 1).  The most important change may be in 
the governance of the Pact.  First, a consensus has emerged to give to the 
Commission the right to bark and bite, i.e. to send an early warning to a 
member countries without the approval of the Council
16 .  This is a 
welcome step towards distinguishing assessment from decision.  Second, 
with SGP2, the eurozone has moved away from its initial emphasis on 
governance by fixed rules and has reintroduced discretion.  However, it 
has neither put in place intellectual foundations for a renewed system of 
governance nor addressed the issue of enforcement.  How the new 
provisions will be interpreted and implemented therefore remains to be 
seen.  The risk of undisciplined case-by-case decisions guided by political 
pressure and horse-trading is significant.   
It is however unlikely that member countries will return to the drawing 
board before having experimented with the effects of the recent reform.  
What is now needed is a clear doctrine that preserves discretion but 
constrains choices and ensures they remain consistent over time and 
across countries.  Otherwise, the very legitimacy of a common discipline 
will be undermined.  Whether or not the Council will be able to adopt this 
constrained discretion mode of governance depends on the (now fixed) 
presidency of the Eurogroup and on the (still rotating) one of the Ecofin 
Council.   
 
                                                                      
16 Although the corresponding legal provision has been a victim of the rejection by French 
and Dutch voters of the draft constitution, the Commission has made a step forward by 
making public its reports on stability programmes before the ECOFIN discussions.   19
IV. TOWARDS A “SUSTAINABILITY AND GROWTH PACT” 
What should a sensible modus operandi of SGP2 look like? In our view, it 
should (a) reconcile long-term sustainability and short-term stabilisation; 
(b) approach sustainability in a way which is economically sound and does 
not give too much leeway to political discretion; and (c) foster, or at least 
avoid to discourage, growth-enhancing economic reforms.  While fulfilling 
these requirements, it should also be instrumental in helping the eurozone 
face its current priorities. 
In the remainder of this paper, we elaborate on our previous work 
(Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2005) to make the case for a “Sustainability and 
Growth Pact” which would meet these requirements, and we sketch out its 
main building blocks. 
Present Priorities 
The eurozone faces three priority challenges: ageing populations, 
enlargement, and the need for growth-enhancing reforms.  A 
Sustainability and Growth Pact should help on all three fronts.   
Ageing.  According to the UN, the share of the working-age population in 
the total population will fall from 66% in 2005 to 56% in 2050 in the four 
big European countries, while it will only decline from 67% to 62% in the 
US.  The additional burden of pensions, health and long-term care will be 
only partially offset by lower education costs and, possibly, reduced 
unemployment benefits.  This will have immense consequences on 
Europe’s economic performance and public finances.   
 
FIGURE 4:  General Government Debt Trajectories in the Absence 
of Fiscal Consolidation, 2004-2050 
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Note:  Extrapolation of general government gross debt assuming the underlying primary 
balance remains the same as the 2004 level and no stock-flows operations take place.  
Data unavailable for Portugal.   20
Source:  European Commission (2005) 
The best source so far for assessing the magnitude of the problem is the 
report by the Economic Policy Committee working group on ageing 
(Economic Policy Committee, 2003, hereafter “AWG”)
17.  According to the 
working group, public spending will increase by 3 to 7% of GDP in most 
member states by 2050 if no corrective action is taken
18.  The working 
group has also extrapolated budget balances and debt levels up to 2050 
and calculated a “tax gap” à la Blanchard (1990), i.e. the adjustment 
needed in the tax rate, either to ensure inter-temporal balance or to reach 
a given debt level in 2050 (40% of GDP in the AWG projections).   
Projections showed that depending on the target, the “tax gap” amounted 
to 4 to 7% of GDP in France and Germany – a frightening height for 
countries with already high levels of government receipts.  An alternative 
approach is to project the debt ratio
19.  Figure 4 shows the Commission 
projections based on the work of the ageing working group assuming the 
underlying primary balance remains the same as in 2004 and no stock-
flows operations take place.  Debt-to-GDP ratios would approach or 
exceed 200% in France, Italy, the Netherlands and Greece in 2050.   
Standard and Poor’s has produced qualitatively similar results (Kraemer, 
2005). 
Enlargement. Ten new members joined the EU in 2004, several of which 
are expected to join EMU soon.  Romania, Bulgaria and other Balkan 
countries will follow.  However, the debt/deficit dynamics is not the same 
for a high growth, high inflation “New Europe” country and for a low 
growth, low inflation “Old Europe” country.  Between 1999 and 2004, 
nominal GDP growth averaged 8.1% per year in the 10 new EU members 
against 5.4% in the eurozone.  This implies that the debt-stabilising 
primary surplus is on average lower for the new members.  In Figure 5, 
we have sorted eurozone and new member countries according to the 
primary balance that would have stabilised their debt-to-GDP ratio in 2004 
(based on their average 1999-2004 nominal growth).  Among the new 
members, only Slovenia and Malta needed a fiscal surplus to stabilise their 
debt ratio, while this was the case for six eurozone countries.  Nominal 
GDP growth rates will not converge in the foreseeable future, as price 
levels and GDP per capita will still need to catch up with those of the 
eurozone.  Deficit targets should therefore not be uniform. 
                                                                      
17 This report is - a first attempt at providing a comprehensive and consistent picture - is 
not without defects and a new report is expected for 2006.  But the numbers are already 
scary (Economic Policy Committee, 2003). 
18 Note that the AWG figures we refer to were published in 2003, prior to substantial 
pension reforms in France and Germany.  The updated 2006 figures were not available 
when this paper was written. 
19  This is technically equivalent to adding to current public debt implicit age-related 
liabilities.   21
FIGURE 5:  Debt-Stabilising and Actual Primary Fiscal Positions (as 
% of GDP), 2004 
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Source:  Authors’ computation based on excessive deficit procedure figures 
 
Economic reform.  Reform seems to have slowed rather than accelerated 
since the creation of EMU (Elmeskøv and Duval, 2005).  Five years after 
the Lisbon Council set overly ambitious goals, the lack of political 
incentives has created a deadlock.   
The Pact should help break this deadlock and reward reforms as long as 
they are favourable to long-term growth and/or help improve the 
government’s long-term fiscal position.   
The design and implementation of a reform-friendly Pact is not an easy 
task since there can be strong disagreements among member states and 
with the ECB on the effectiveness, or even the desirability of some policies 
(remember the French 35-hour working week) and on the time it will take 
for them to yield benefits.  For sure, any newly elected government will 
claim that its programme is good for growth and ask for more budgetary 
leeway (remember Nigel Lawson’s famous claim that potential output 
growth had accelerated right after he had taken office).  Hence the need 
for commonly agreed monitoring. 
Proposals 
Wrapping up the preceding remarks, the five building blocks of a 
Sustainability and Growth Pact would be:  concepts, accounts, targets, 
procedures, and institutions. 
Concepts 
Clarity is needed on the methodology of the sustainability assessment and 
on the choice of the state variable for the monitoring of a government’s 
fiscal situation.   22
T h e  r e l e v a n t  s c o p e  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  g e n e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  ( i.e. central 
government, local government and social security), as has been the case 
since the Maastricht Treaty, because most countries have organised 
transfers between government sub-sectors, and because all government 
entities are by definition funded by taxes.  It would in theory make sense 
to include the national central bank to account for seigniorage revenue, 
but within EMU we can make the assumption that seigniorage does not 
depend on government policies.   
The relevant state variable should be the net value of the government 
sector, i.e. the difference between its total assets and financial liabilities 
(excluding implicit liabilities).  This is the closest equivalent to a 
company’s equity.  Non-financial government assets are known to be 
difficult to define, inventory and value:  think of the Tower of London or 
the North Sea oilfields.  They are frequently non-marketable, and when 
they are, valuing them on the basis of their future cash flows or of their 
liquidation value makes quite a difference.  However, no sound fiscal 
policy can ignore the proper management of the government’s balance 
sheet, and as already discussed, monitoring gross debt creates an 
incentive to hold a fire sale of public assets and worsen the long-term 
fiscal position.  There is therefore a case for taking into account at least 
marketable assets (maybe not the Louvre, but certainly EDF) 
Implicit liabilities such as pensions cannot be aggregated to financial 
liabilities because they belong to a different class of debt.  Governments 
can default on them without incurring financial crisis, and in fact, this is 
what a pension reform frequently amounts to
20.  Their present value can 
“jump” as a consequence of parametric reforms or changes in growth 
assumptions.  In addition, they depend intrinsically on the discount factor 
used to compute them and are therefore more fragile
21.  We therefore 
propose to use separately the present value of age-related net 
expenditures, as an input for choosing the target for the government net 
value.   
Sustainability should then be defined on the basis of a target for the net 
value of the government as a percentage of GDP at a certain point in time. 
This horizon should be distant enough to allow for corrective measures 
and to leave room for cyclical stabilisation
22, and close enough to be 
relevant for a newly elected government.  This is compatible with the 
                                                                      
20 Indeed, one of the reasons why Eurostat decided not to treat unfunded pay-as-you-go 
pension schemes as on-balance liabilities is that “their value can be unilaterally altered 
by the debtor” (Eurostat, 2004). 
21 Franco, Marino and Zotteri (2004) discuss the measurement of pension liabilities and 
their link with fiscal sustainability. They conclude as we do that pension liabilities should 
not be added to conventional debt but should be used to complement the debt and deficit 
indicators. See also Oksanen (2004) for a discussion. 
22 This follows the line of the British Code for Fiscal Stability that requires that “over the 
economic cycle, the Government will ensure the level of public debt as a proportion of 
national income is held at a stable and prudent level”.   23
present Treaty since it is only another, economically more sensible, way of 
interpreting the “close to balance or in surplus” requirement. 
Accounts 
EU statistical institutes currently produce a set of quarterly and annual 
national accounts, and they release general government deficit and gross 
debt numbers on a yearly basis.  They should be required to produce a 
limited number of government balance sheet items such as a breakdown 
of financial debt (distinguishing credit lines, bills and bonds), financial 
assets (distinguishing gold, cash, equity, and loans) and non-financial 
assets (including real estate)
23.  Accounts should be audited by Eurostat 
or by private auditing companies.   
This is less heroic than it sounds.  Several EU governments are publishing 
or are committed to publish their assets and liabilities under international 
accounting standards, following pioneering countries outside the eurozone 
(notably, New Zealand, Australia, the US, the UK and Sweden).  France 
will publish an opening financial statement as of 1/1/2006.  Table 2 gives 
an example of such a balance sheet, in national accounting (which may 
slightly differ from private accounting).  The French general government 
“equity”, i.e. its net value, was €308bn or 19.4% of GDP as of 31/12/2003. 
In addition, the EU should build on the AWG work and agree on a 
methodology for recording age-related liabilities
24.  An adequate method 
for comparison with balance sheet items would be to compute the net 
present value of Age-Related Net Implicit Liabilities (‘ARNIL’), i.e. the 
present value of age-related expenditures of the first-pillar pension 
schemes, net of corresponding contributions and age-related savings on 
the budget (e.g. on education spending) over a 30 to 50 year horizon, 
using a commonly agreed discount factor
25. 
                                                                      
23 The breakdown should help assess the liquidity of the government.  
24   This is consistent with the OECD suggestion to record below the line of net 
lending/borrowing the flows linked to pensions liabilities (Lequiller, 2004). 
25 We do not propose to include other off-balance sheet liabilities such as guarantees, 
catastrophe insurance, etc., as they depend on whether a given risk does or does not 
materialise.     24
 
TABLE 2:  The Balance Sheet of the French General Government at 
End-2003 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
 €bn  %  of 
GDP 
€bn %  of 
GDP 
 
Non-financial 
Assets 
€1008bn 63.6%  - -  - 
Financial 
Assets 
€584bn 36.9%  €1284bn 81% Financial 
Liabilities 
-  -  -  €308bn   19.4%  Net Value 
Total  Assets  €1592bn 100.4% €1592bn 100.4% Total 
Liabilities 
                    
Source: INSEE, Comptes de patrimoine 
Targets   
Each country should adopt a target for the government’s net value as a 
percentage of GDP.  In the appendix, we show that the sustainable net 
value of the government is the sum of two components:  ARNIL and the 
net present value of all other future expenditures, including the 
opportunity cost of holding government assets rather than buying back 
debt.  A rough method could be to set a uniform target for the latter, and 
to apply a haircut to ARNIL in order to take into account the fact it does 
not represent financial claims and can be defaulted at a lower cost than 
financial claims through parametric reforms.  Thus, the T-year target 
*
T t V +  
for the government net value Vt could be: 
) .
~
( ) 1 (
*
t t T t T t ARNIL V V V V θ λ λ + + − = ≥ + +  
where T = 5 year is the target horizon, V
~
  is the long-term net value 
target, λ <1 a smoothing factor and θ<1 is the haircut coefficient.  Note 
that applying a haircut to ARNIL is equivalent to using a mark-up when 
discounting future liabilities, to acknowledge the fact that age-related 
claims can be defaulted on all the more easily as they are distant in the 
future.   
We take here as tentative values for the parameters are λ = 0.25 
(meaning that one quarter of the relative gap between Vt and its target 
would be closed at a 5-year horizon) and θ = 0.5 (meaning that half of 
the value of age-related implicit liabilities is discounted). 
It could be argued that V
~
 should be lower for countries that exhibit debt 
intolerance, such as emerging market countries (Reinhardt, Rogoff and 
Savastano, 2003).  We make the assumption that this is not the case for 
any of the EU countries.  Unlike in emerging countries, eurozone   25
governments can be supposed to have permanent access to financial 
markets.  V
~
  could in principle be negative since it can be backed by a 
sequence of future surpluses.  In the absence of a normative theory of 
government balance sheet management, in view of the illiquidity of a 
large part of the government assets and to provide a safety margin, it is 
safer to take V
~
 to be positive.     
To set these parameters, further empirical calibration based on actual 
numbers would certainly be required.  Here, we make an illustrative back-
of-the envelope numerical application in the French case, where the assets 
and liabilities figures are available as of 31/12/2003.  The ageing working 
group expected age-related costs in France to go up from 26.4% of GDP 
in 2003 to 30.5% in 2050 (Economic Policy Committee, 2003).  We take 
2% for the discount rate – note that since age-related costs are measured 
in proportion to GDP, the discount rate is commensurate with the 
difference between the equilibrium real interest rate and the growth rate. 
Assuming that the costs are stabilised from 2050 onwards, the AWG 
projection implies that ARNIL was equal to 155.4% of GDP at end-2003.  
With V
~
 =  0,  λ = 0.25 and θ = 0.5, we find V*2008 = 34 % of GDP 
against V2003 = 19.4% (Table 2). The unambitious target of a zero net 
value of the government would thus imply an adjustment of almost 3% of 
GDP per year in the period between 2003 and 2008! 
Obviously, the results depend on the parameters.  This is an unavoidable 
consequence of working with present values (as illustrated by the current 
debate on the burden of corporate defined-benefits pension plans in the 
US).  However, to simply overlook future liabilities because their 
measurement raises technical difficulties amounts to choosing an infinite 
discount factor, which is hardly a satisfactory assumption either.   
Procedures 
The EU recently reformed its procedures and now prepares “integrated 
guidelines” that set out three-year plans for both macro- and 
microeconomic policies (plus employment policies).  In a similar vein, we 
propose the following procedures.  Every year, each country would publish 
a plan consisting in three elements:  a fiscal plan, a reform plan, and a 
contingency plan:   
  The fiscal plan should be along the lines of today’s stability 
programmes, but with a longer horizon and projections of both assets 
and liabilities.  It would describe a sequence of deficits and balance 
sheet operations (such as privatisations or asset purchases, 
securitisations, one-off revenues or payments, etc.) as a way to reach 
the target level for the government’s net value.  The deficit target 
would therefore be no longer be uniform since it would depend both on 
the target (which varies from one country to another) and on the 
nominal growth rate, which makes it more or less easy to reach the 
target.     26
  The reform plan would underpin the growth trajectory beneath the 
fiscal plan. It would resemble the existing “national reform plans”, but 
with a stronger link to budgetary policy.  An ambitious reform plan that 
has the potential to permanently increase output could justify a less 
ambitious fiscal plan. Every year, the Commission would review the 
implementation of the plans: countries that breached their deficit 
target would be expected to be warned, and eventually sanctioned, 
especially if they also failed to deliver the promised reforms. 
  The contingency plan would describe how budgetary policy would 
respond to shocks – good and bad, such as an unexpected increase in 
tax revenues or a recession.  It would expand on elements that have 
been introduced in the stability programmes already, albeit in a more 
systematic way.  The contingency plan would thus address the 
inflexibility of a medium term-oriented fiscal strategy and could be 
used by the Commission in the assessment of fiscal developments. 
From a political economy standpoint, it would be highly advisable for an 
incoming government to map out its economic strategy by preparing and 
publishing mutually consistent fiscal, reform and contingency plans for the 
period corresponding to the length of its mandate.  The plans would 
indicate how the government envisaged the net value of the government 
to evolve as a consequence of its action, how it intended to address the 
consistency between its fiscal and structural strategies, and how it could 
be expected to react to events.  Those plans could be changed in the 
following years, but vis-à-vis a government’s European partners as well as 
in front of the markets, their mere existence would represent a constraint 
on a government’s temptation to err with the wind.   
Institutions 
Is such a scheme politically feasible?  As already noticed, the SGP was not 
properly integrated in member states’ domestic agendas, and was at best 
used as a scapegoat to justify fiscal adjustment.  
One possible solution would be to hand over fiscal responsibility to an 
unelected body such as a “fiscal policy committee” (Wyplosz, 2002).  This 
solution is dear to some professional economists but after the French and 
Dutch referendums, we doubt that the European people would like it.   
Expert committees can nevertheless play a role in assessing the reform 
plans submitted by member countries.  As already stressed, a risk of our 
approach, as of any departure from strict deficit monitoring, is to give 
politicians a free hand by removing the fiscal constraint in exchange for 
hollow promises.  Reforms have to be assessed ex-ante, then monitored: 
this can be done by the Commission, but also by independent national 
fiscal audit committees as proposed by the Sapir (2004) report. 
A key issue is how to create more political ownership of the SGP.  Since 
the EU is not a standard representative democracy – Collignon (2004) 
discusses why and how to make it one – the only way to achieve this goal 
is through national parliaments.  This implies that the fiscal, reform and   27
contingency plans should be approved by Parliament after they have been 
discussed by Ecofin, so that Parliament can take account of the remarks 
made in Brussels.  Since most member countries have their budget after 
the summer, this calls for a “SGP round” in Brussels during the spring.   
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
One might wonder whether EMU needs a fiscal framework at all.  After all, 
the US never really had one, and it does not seem to hurt them that much.  
But full fiscal discretion is not an option in a monetary union that does not 
exclude financial solidarity among its members but does not have a 
centralised government.  It is the fate of Europe to weave endlessly at her 
loom and create new rules or institutions. 
This paper has argued that the fiscal framework in place is far from 
satisfactory.  We are not amused by its travails and would not rejoice at 
its eventual demise: failure to agree on and enforce a common fiscal 
philosophy could be a strong negative signal for the future of monetary 
union.   
This is why we emphasise the need to take seriously the objective of a 
Sustainability and Growth Pact that would fully exploit the potential of the 
reformed SGP.  Our proposals are certainly a matter for discussion.  But 
we strongly believe that the technicalities of a sustainability assessment 
should not deter policymakers from addressing the underlying issues.  It 
is certainly easier to focus on the deficit as currently measured and to 
overlook the more complex issues.  However this is at the expense of the 
appropriateness, and therefore of the legitimacy, of the Pact.  There is no 
easy way to address the challenges that threaten European prosperity.   
Implementing a “Sustainability and Growth Pact” such as the one outlined 
in this paper would not eliminate the need for better governance of the 
eurozone.  The more the Pact departs from the set of simple rules it 
consisted of initially, the more an effective and politically legitimate 
governance structure will be needed.  However, for decisions to be 
consistent across cases and over time, the first step will be to provide for 
sound conceptual and accounting foundations. 
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APPENDIX:  Fiscal Sustainability with a Full Government Balance Sheet 
 
We summarise the general government balance sheet as follows: 
 
(1) At = Bt + Vt    where  At are financial and non-financial assets at 
market value 
     B t are financial liabilities at market value 
     V t is the government net value 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the yield rt on government bonds and 
the yield ρt on government assets are constant over time.  Also, we ignore all 
valuation effects, i.e. we treat At, Bt and Vt as if they were registered at face 
value.  In a more realistic model, revaluation should be accounted for.  For 
instance, there could be cases of government finances that would be sustainable 
only as a consequence of an asset price bubble. The government’s budget 
constraint is as follows: 
 
(2) (Bt – Bt-1) – (At – At-1) = rBt-1 - St  
 
St being the primary budget surplus.  Note that St excludes interest payments 
but includes asset revenues such as dividends and rents.  We can define a 
“primary primary” surplus Ζt = St - ρAt-1 excluding asset revenues.  Putting 
together (1) and (2) shows that selling government assets improves the 
sustainability of Vt only insofar as these assets yield less that the government 
bond debt: 
 
(3) Vt = (1+r)Vt-1 + St – rAt-1 = (1+r)Vt-1 + Ζt + (ρ-r)At-1 
 
Under perfect foresight, we can use (3) to express the government net value as 
the sum of future budget surpluses at any horizon: 
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We rule out the possibility for Vt to follow an explosive path: (5)
  0 ) 1 ( lim = + +
−
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k
k V r . Let Vt* be the “sustainable” government net value:  V* 
is thus given by: 
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Note that the government net value can be negative, i.e.  financial debt can 
exceed government assets, if a path of non-negative primary surpluses (after 
accounting for the opportunity cost of holding government assets rather than 
buying back debt) is expected to materialise and reimburse this debt.  
Suppose now that we can identify the age-related component of the primary 
surplus: 
 
(7) S  =  St
na + St
a   where  St
a < 0 is net age–related revenues and 
St
na = St - St
a.   33
 
and let ARNIL be age-related net implicit liabilities:   
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Sustainability can now be written:  (9)
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The sustainable net value is the sum of two components:  ARNIL, and the net 
present value of all other future expenditures, including the opportunity cost of 
holding government assets rather than buying back debt. 